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I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to venues for copyright infringement, there was a
time when nothing could compete with the flea market. Traditionally,
flea markets are places to buy and sell secondhand goods and an-
tiques. But in the 1970s and 1980s, flea markets also became places to
buy and sell unauthorized recordings of copyrighted music. It was big
business. Indeed, as late as 1991, police raided a California flea mar-
ket and walked away with over 38,000 illegal tape recordings.'
The legal issues raised by flea market infringement were conten-
tious in their day. The first step was easy: individual sellers of pirated
music were obviously guilty of copyright infringement. But what
about the firms and individuals that owned implicated markets? Were
they also liable? From one perspective, surely not, as these owners
had done nothing more than create a space where buyers and sellers
could interact. However, these owners did benefit from infringement
* Douglas Lichtman is Professor of Law and William Landes is the Clifton R. Musser
Professor of Law and Economics, both at the University of Chicago Law School. An earlier
version of this Article appeared in the Spring 2003 issue of the Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, Our thanks to the Journal for authorizing this expanded treatment, and to David
Friedman, Jane Ginsburg, Assaf Hamdani, Neil Netanel, John Pfaff, and Lior Strahilevitz
for helpful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge the Olin and Bradley Foundations,
Merck, Microsoft, and Pfizer for their generous financial support of the law and economics
program at the Law School.
I. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
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in that cheap music was part of what brought buyers and sellers to the
market. Moreover, the owners likely could have done more to clamp
down on unlawful behavior, such as screening vendors more aggres-
sively or performing spot checks on transactions.
Today, the flea market is no longer a significant battleground for
copyright law, but the same basic legal question continues to loom:
how far should copyright liability extend beyond any direct lawbreak-
ers? For example, should a firm that produces photocopiers be re-
quired to compensate authors for any unauthorized copies made on
that firm's machines? What about firms that manufacture personal
computers or offer Internet access; should they be liable, at least in
part, for online music piracy?
In this Article, we inquire into the question of when indirect li-
ability should be used to increase compliance with the law. The argu-
ment in favor of liability is that third parties are often in a good
position to discourage copyright infringement either by monitoring
direct infringers or by redesigning their technologies to make in-
fringement more difficult. The argument against is that legal liability
almost inevitably interferes with the legitimate use of implicated
tools, services, and venues.
2
II. THE ECONOMICS OF INDIRECT LIABILITY
Unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act of 1976 does not explic-
itly recognize the possibility of indirect liability. Nevertheless, courts
have held third parties liable for copyright infringement under two




Contributory infringement applies where one party knowingly in-
duces, causes, or otherwise materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another. The adverb "knowingly" is perhaps misleading in
that it takes on an unusual meaning in this setting. It does not simply
mean "awareness of infringement" but instead implies some meaning-
ful capacity to prevent or discourage infringement. Consider the fol-
2. A large literature considers the economics of copyright law more generally, not focus-
ing explicitly on indirect liability. For a good introduction, see William M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
3. For a more formal introduction to these doctrines, see ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 782-806 (6th ed. 2001); MARSHALL A.
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT 399-402 (3d ed. 2002). Kraakman surveys the
concept of indirect liability outside the copyright setting in Reinier Kraakman, Third Party
Liability, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 583 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).
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lowing example: suppose that C manufactures a decoder box that en-
ables any purchaser B to unscramble premium and pay-per-view cable
programs without paying for them. A is the injured copyright holder
who owns those programs. Should the equipment maker C be held
liable to A for purchaser B's infringement of copyright?
Two considerations bear mention. First, there are likely to be sub-
stantial enforcement and administrative savings if injured copyright
holders like A are allowed to sue C rather than pursuing each B indi-
vidually. Even if each B has sufficient resources to pay for the harm
he causes, the costs of tracking down that many Bs, gathering evi-
dence as to the specific activities of each, and then litigating that
many separate lawsuits would likely make it uneconomical for A to
enforce its copyright. Because each B knows this in advance, each has
little incentive to comply with the law. If the law holds C liable for
damages caused by B, by contrast, the savings in enforcement costs
are likely to be sufficiently large for A to enforce its copyright.4 A
might still face problems proving damages - this would require evi-
dence about the separate actions of the many Bs - but the prospect of
liability will most likely put C out of business and, in this example,
lead most Bs to pay for cable rather than stealing it.
Second, if there are lawful uses of C's product, the case for liabil-
ity is weakened. The "lawful use" question does not arise in the de-
coder example because the decoder's only conceivable use involves
violating the law. But consider a firm that produces photocopiers or
personal computers. Such a firm literally does "know" that some of its
customers will infringe copyright, but the firm does not have specific
knowledge about any particular customer. Thus, even though substan-
tial savings in enforcement costs might still arise in these cases were
courts to impose liability, it is unlikely that any court would be willing
to do so. The benefits in terms of increased copyright enforcement
come at too high a cost in terms of possible interference with the sale
of a legitimate product.
5
4. If C is sued, C will often be allowed to sue the various Bs for compensation. The same
factors that made it uneconomical for the copyright holder to sue each B, however, may
make these lawsuits uneconomical for C as well.
5. An interesting counterpoint is to consider whether the result should be different when
the issue is not photocopying machines sold individually to consumers but instead photo-
copying services like those provided by Kinko's and various university copy centers. Poten-
tial legal liability in these instances is based on theories of direct rather than indirect
liability; Kinko's does not merely enable its customers to infringe, after all, it actually does
the infringing for them. The policy issues at stake seem similar, however. For example, it
might be that these firms should be held liable on grounds that copy center employees are in
a good position to monitor for and discourage copyright violations. To see these issues in
context, see Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (holding photocopying service liable for direct infringement). For an inter-
esting further analogy to the use of photocopying machines in libraries, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 108(f) (2003) (noting that nothing in the provision "shall be construed to impose liability
upon a library or archives or its employees for the unsupervised use of reproducing equip-
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In some cases it may be possible for the equipment maker C to
redesign its product in a way that would eliminate or greatly reduce
the level of infringement without significantly cutting down on the
quantity and quality of lawful uses. In such cases, liability is again
attractive. Often, however, these sorts of solutions are out of reach.
For instance, it is hard to imagine a redesigned photocopier that would
make infringement less attractive without substantially interfering
with lawful duplication. As a result, holding the equipment manufac-
turer liable would be equivalent to imposing a tax on the offending
product. The "tax" would reduce overall purchases of photocopiers
and it would redistribute income to copyright holders, but it would not
in any way encourage users to substitute non-infringing for infringing
uses.
The examples of the decoder box and the photocopier mark two
extremes and serve to delineate the key issues. Holding all else equal,
contributory liability is more attractive: a) the greater the harm from
direct copyright infringement; b) the less the benefit from lawful use
of the indirect infringer's product; c) the lower the costs of modifying
the product in ways that cut down infringing activities without sub-
stantially interfering with legal ones; and d) the greater the extent to
which indirect liability reduces the costs of copyright enforcement as
compared to a system that allows only direct liability.
B. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability applies in situations where one party - often
an employer - has control over another and also enjoys a direct fi-
nancial benefit from that other's infringing activities. A typical case
arises where an employer hires an employee for a lawful purpose, but
the employee's actions on behalf of the employer lead to copyright
infringement. One rationale for imposing liability in this instance is
that the employer should be encouraged to exercise care in hiring,
supervising, controlling, and monitoring its employees so as to make
copyright infringement less likely. Another is that it is usually cheaper
for copyright holders to sue one employer rather than suing multiple
infringing employees. A final rationale is that liability helps to mini-
mize the implications of bankrupt infringers. An employee cannot
compensate an injured copyright holder if that employee does not
have adequate financial resources. Indirect liability solves this prob-
lem by putting the employer's resources on the line, thereby increas-
ing the odds that the harm from infringement will be internalized.6
ment located on the premises" (emphasis added) so long as the "equipment displays a notice
that the making of a copy may be subject to the copyright law").
6. Of course, the employer might also lack sufficient funds. Note, too, that employers are
only held responsible for infringements that occur within the scope of employment. In-
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The example of a dance hall operator illustrates these points.
Dance hall operators hire bands and other performers who sometimes
violate copyright law by performing copyrighted work without per-
mission. Often these performers lack the resources needed to pay for
the associated harm. In these circumstances, indirect liability has real
policy allure. It is probably less expensive for a copyright holder to
sue the dance hall operator than it is for him to sue each performer
individually, both because there are many performers and because the
dance hall operator is likely easier to identify and to serve with legal
process. Putting litigation costs to one side, it is also the case that
dance hall operators are typically in a position to monitor the behavior
of direct infringers at a relatively low cost. After all, the operator is
probably already monitoring the dance hall quite carefully in order to
ensure that patrons are being well treated, employees are not siphon-
ing funds from the till, and so on. Finally, because performers are
more likely than dance hall owners to lack the resources required to
pay damages for copyright infringement, vicarious liability in this
instance prevents the externalization of copyright harm.
It is worth pointing out that the threat of vicarious liability has
encouraged dance halls, concert halls, stadiums, radio stations, televi-
sion stations, and other similar entities to look for an inexpensive way
to acquire performance rights. For the most part, they do this by pur-
chasing blanket licenses from performing rights societies, the two
largest of which are Broadcast Music International ("BMI") and the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
("ASCAP"). ASCAP and BMI hold non-exclusive performance rights
to nearly all copyrighted music. The blanket licenses they sell give
licensees the right to perform publicly all the songs in the performing
rights society's repertoire for as many times as the licensee likes dur-
ing the term of the license. The blanket license saves enormous trans-
action costs by eliminating the need for thousands of licenses with
individual copyright holders and by eliminating the need for perform-
ers to notify copyright holders in advance with respect to music they
intend to perform. In addition, the blanket license solves the marginal
use problem because each licensee will act as if the cost of an addi-
tional performance is zero - which is, in fact, the social cost for mu-
sic already created.
fringement committed by an employee on his own time and for personal reasons would not
trigger vicarious liability. For a discussion of the economics, see Alan 0. Sykes, Vicarious
Liability, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND TIlE LAW, supra note
3, at 673.
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III. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION
The doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious liability
have evolved over time, with adjustments coming from both the
courts and Congress. Of these, probably the most significant was the
1984 Supreme Court decision in Sony v. Universal City Studios.7 The
plaintiffs were firms that produced programs for television; the defen-
dants manufactured an early version of the videocassette recorder
("VCR"). The plaintiffs' legal claim was that VCRs enable viewers to
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted television programs. This
was troubling to the copyright holders mainly because viewers watch-
ing taped shows can more easily skip commercials, and that obviously
diminishes the value of the associated copyrighted programming. Su-
ing viewers directly would have been both infeasible and unpopular,
so the program suppliers sued the VCR manufacturers on theories of
both contributory infringement and vicarious liability.
The Supreme Court rejected both theories. Vicarious liability
was rejected because the Court did not believe that VCR manufactur-
ers had meaningful control over their infringing customers. As the
Court saw the issue, the only contact between VCR manufacturers and
their customers occurred "at the moment of sale," a time far too re-
moved from any infringement for the manufacturers to be rightly
compared to controlling employers. 9 Contributory infringement, by
contrast, was rejected on the ground that the VCR is "capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses" - legitimate uses that in the Court's view
left manufacturers powerless to distinguish lawful from unlawful be-
havior.'
0
Whether one agrees or disagrees with these results, there is much
to criticize in the Court's analysis. On vicarious liability, the Court
took a needlessly restrictive view of what it means for a manufacturer
to "control" its purchasers. For example, the Court did not consider
whether a relatively simple technology solution - say, making the
fast forward button imprecise and thus diminishing the ease with
which purchasers can skip commercials - might have gone a long
way toward protecting copyright holders without interfering unduly
with legitimate uses. On contributory infringement, meanwhile, while
the Court was certainly right to focus on the fact that the VCR is ca-
pable of substantial non-infringing uses, the Court erred when it failed
to put that fact into context. Full analysis requires that the benefits
associated with legitimate use be weighed against the harms associ-
7. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
8. As a technical matter, it is ambiguous whether the Court's analysis of vicarious liabil-
ity is binding precedent or mere dicta. See id. at 435 n. 17.
9. Id. at 438.
10. Id. at 442.
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ated with illegitimate use. The Court failed to consider that balance.
Instead, its ruling implies that VCR manufacturers can facilitate any
copyright violation they wish so long as they can prove that VCRs
also facilitate some non-trivial amount of legitimate behavior.
Importantly, however, mere dissection of the legal analysis
misses the heart of the Sony decision. The driving concern in Sony
was a fear that indirect liability would have given copyright holders
control over what was then a new and still-developing technology.
This the Court was unwilling to do. Copyright law, the Court wrote,
must "strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate de-
mand for effective ... protection ... and the rights of others freely to
engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce."" The analo-
gous modem situation would be a lawsuit attempting to hold Internet
service providers liable for online copyright infringement. It is easy to
see why courts would be reluctant to enforce such liability. Copyright
law is important, but at some point copyright incentives must take a
backseat to other societal interests, including an interest in promoting
the development of new technologies and an interest in experimenting
with new business opportunities and market structures.12
After Sony, the next significant refinement to the law of indirect
copyright liability came from Congress in the form of the Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992.13 As a practical matter, this statute is
unimportant; it carefully regulates a technology that turned out to be
an embarrassing commercial flop. 14 But in understanding indirect
copyright liability, this statute marks an important step. It immunized
two groups from liability: producers of digital audiotape equipment
and manufacturers of blank digital audiotapes.' 5 Immunity was con-
tingent, however, on digital audiotape equipment being redesigned to
include a security feature that would diminish the risk of infringement
by limiting the number of duplicate recordings that can be made from
any single digital audiotape.1 In addition, the statute imposed a mod-
est royalty on the sale of blank tapes and new digital audio equipment,
the proceeds of which were to be shared among copyright holders as
an offset against their anticipated piracy losses. 17 By mandating a
11. Id.
12. Several recent articles emphasize this relationship between copyright law and either
market structure or political institutions. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry
Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002); Jessica Litman,
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002).
13. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10
(2003)).
14. See Stephen W. Webb, Note, RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems: The Recording
Industry Attempts to Slow the MP3 Revolution - Taking Aim at the Jogger Friendly Dia-
mond Rio, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, 5 n.5 (2000).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2003).
16. Id. § 1002.
17. Id. § 1004.
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change in technology to reduce the risk of copyright violation and by
setting up a compensation fund for injured copyright holders, this law
stands in sharp contrast to the Sony decision where VCR technology
was left unchanged and injured copyright holders were left uncom-
pensated.
Congress became involved with indirect liability again in 1998
when it passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. One provision
immunizes from indirect liability a broad class of Internet access pro-
viders, telecommunications companies, and Internet search engines,
so long as these entities satisfy certain specific requirements designed
to safeguard copyright holders' interests.1 9 Before this legislation
came into effect, the liability associated with many of these entities
was in doubt. Was an Internet service provider vulnerable to a claim
of vicarious liability given that it charges its users for Internet access
and has ultimate control over what is, and what is not, available
online? Was an online auction site like eBay liable since the site prof-
its every time a seller sells an infringing item? The Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act answered these questions by establishing a safe
harbor: if these Internet entities follow the requirements laid out by
the statute - requirements that typically require the entity to act when
a specific instance of infringement is either readily apparent or called
to the entity's attention by a copyright owner - they are immune
from charges of vicarious liability and contributory infringement.
20
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act added another significant
provision as well. Under this provision, it is illegal for a firm to manu-
facture, import, or otherwise provide to consumers a device primarily
designed "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted
work, or otherwise to avoid.., a technological measure" used to pro-
tect copyrighted work. 2' This provision has proven controversial for
two reasons. First, it adopts a standard for liability that is much less
forgiving than that articulated by the Supreme Court in Sony. In par-
ticular, to avoid condemnation under this provision, the accused de-
vice must not be "primarily designed" to avoid technological
measures; must have a "commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent"; 23 and must not be "marketed" as a circum-
18. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2003).
20. Id. eBay itself turns out to be an interesting case in that eBay earns profit based on the
sale of individual items and thus likely does not qualify for the safe harbor. See id.
§ 512(c)(I)(B) (protecting only those firms that do "not receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity"). Had eBay charged a flat fee for listing auction items,
by contrast, it might have qualified for protection, much as ISPs qualify despite the fact that
they charge a flat fee each month for Internet access.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2003).
22. Id. §§ 1201(a)(2)(A), 1201(b)(l)(A).
23. Id. §§ 1201(a)(2)(B), 1201(b)(l)(B).
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vention device. 24 Second, devices rendered illegal by this provision
include not only devices that allow consumers to circumvent any
"technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
holder ' 25 but also, more broadly, devices that allow consumers to cir-
cumvent any "technological measure that effectively controls access"
to a copyrighted work. 6 That said, many copyright owners use tech-
nology to protect their work, and the intuition behind this provision is
that the law should support their efforts on grounds that this sort of
self-help is less costly and more effective than more traditional forms
of copyright protection.
2 7
Probably the most talked about litigation on indirect copyright li-
ability is the music industry's recent lawsuit against Internet startup
Napster. z8 As readers likely know, Napster facilitated the online ex-
change of music files in two ways: it provided software that allowed a
user to identify any song he was willing to share with others, and it
provided a website where that information was made public so that an
individual looking for a particular song would be able to find a willing
donor. Several firms in the music industry sued Napster, alleging that
these tools promoted the unauthorized distribution and duplication of
copyrighted music.
Napster's primary defense was that its service, like a VCR, is ca-
pable of both legal and illegal use. For example, the Napster technol-
ogy can be used to trade recordings that are not protected by copyright
(perhaps because the relevant copyrights have expired) and to trade
recordings by artists who are willing participants in this new distribu-
tion channel. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has thus far rejected this
proposed analogy to Sony, indicating that - whenever the litigation
finally concludes - Napster will likely be found liable for at least
some of the infringement it made possible.
29
The reason, according to the court, is that Napster had the ability
to limit copyright infringement in ways that VCR manufacturers do
24. Id. §§ 1201(a)(2)(C), 1201(b)(1)(C).
25. Id. §§ 1201(b)(I)(A)-(C).
26. Id. §§ 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C).
27. This provision is interesting for another reason as well: it blurs the line between direct
and indirect copyright liability. Under the provision, a firm can be found liable even if the
relevant copyright holder cannot prove that any purchaser actually used the offending prod-
uct. This is therefore not indirect liability as traditionally defined, because indirect liability
traditionally requires that the copyright holder first prove a specific act of infringement.
28. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Obviously, there
is a substantial literature on this case, in part because of the extraordinary public fascination
with the Napster service. For one excellent discussion and pointers into the rest of the litera-
ture. see Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and
Other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (2001).
29. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating
that "the modified preliminary injunction [in the court's previous Napster ruling] correctly
reflects the legal principles of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement that we
previously aniculated.").
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not. For example, in applying the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment, the court determined that Napster likely had the requisite level
of knowledge because, first, Napster had "actual knowledge that spe-
cific infringing material [was] available using its system," and, sec-
ond, Napster could have used that knowledge to identify and block at
least some of the infringing material.3' Similarly, in analyzing the
applicability of vicarious liability, the court emphasized Napster's
ongoing relationship with its customers. 32 At any time, Napster could
have refused service to users who were violating copyright law. VCR
manufacturers, by contrast, have no such power; their relationship
with any customer ends at the moment of sale.
One can quibble with all of these arguments. For instance, this
analysis seems to blur the line between the requirement under con-
tributory infringement that a culpable party have knowledge of the
direct infringement and the requirement under vicarious liability that a
culpable party have control over the specific infringer. Still, the opin-
ion seems to get the basic logic right. Napster is different from a VCR
manufacturer because it has low-cost ways of discouraging piracy
without impinging on legitimate use. As we discuss next, that is the
core insight necessary for the design of an efficient indirect liability
regime.
IV. RETHINKING THE INDIRECT LIABILITY STANDARD
To evaluate all these mechanisms and principles, begin by con-
sidering an instance where it would be relatively easy to identify and
thwart copyright wrongdoing - say, a flea market, where the proprie-
tor could at low cost wander the market and spot vendors hawking
illegal music at rock-bottom prices. The economic analysis in such a
case is straightforward. Assuming that there is sufficient social benefit
from copyright protection in terms of increased incentives for authors
to create and disseminate their work, legal rules should pressure the
flea market proprietor to do his part in enforcing the law. The social
benefits of those increased incentives likely outweigh both the pre-
sumptively small private costs imposed on the market owner and any
minor inconvenience these measures might impose on legitimate sell-
ers.
Now consider the opposite case, namely an instance where it
would be prohibitively expensive to distinguish legal from illegal
copyright activity. Internet service providers are a good example in
this category, in that an entity like America Online would have a hard
time differentiating the unlawful transmission of Mariah Carey's
30. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1022 (emphasis omitted).
31. Id.
32. See id. at 1023-24.
[Vol. 16
Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement
copyrighted music from the perfectly legitimate transmission of
uncopyrighted classical music. Perhaps surprisingly, it might still be
efficient to recognize liability in this instance. After all, instead of
trying in vain to distinguish lawful from unlawful activity, a firm in
this situation would simply increase its price and use that extra reve-
nue to pay any ultimate damage claims. Legal liability, then, would
function like a tax. In many instances such a tax would be welfare-
reducing in that higher prices discourage legal as well as illegal uses.
But in some settings, discouraging both legal and illegal activity
would yield a net welfare gain. This would be true where illegal be-
havior is sufficiently more harmful than legal behavior is beneficial; it
would be true where the harms and benefits are comparable but illegal
behavior is more sensitive to price; and it would be true where the
benefits in terms of increased copyright incentives outweigh the
34harms associated with discouraging legitimate use.
Pulling the lessons from both of the preceding examples together,
then, an efficient approach to indirect liability might start by applying
a negligence rule to any activity that can lead to copyright infringe-
ment. Negligence rules are common in tort law; they hold a party li-
able in cases where that party's failure to take economically
reasonable precautions results in a harm. As applied to Sony, a negli-
gence rule might have asked whether VCR manufacturers adopted a
reasonable design for their technology given its possible legitimate
and illegitimate uses. As applied to flea markets, a negligence rule
might ask whether a given owner monitors his market with sufficient
care. This approach is not radically different from current law. The
difference is that current law focuses on knowledge, control, the ex-
tent of any non-infringing uses, and other factors, without being par-
ticularly clear as to why those issues are central. An explicit
negligence rule would lay bare the underlying logic of the indirect
liability inquiry.
One drawback to the modem implicit negligence approach is that,
as applied to new technologies, it can engender considerable uncer-
33. While classical music itself is typically not protected because the relevant copyright
terms have expired, note that a new performance of a given classical work might be pro-
tected as a sound recording. That is, there are two copyrights to keep in mind with respect to
any piece of music: one that applies to the underlying musical score and another that applies
to the sounds made by some group of artists interpreting the score aloud.
34. The accounting here is tricky. The benefit associated with imposing indirect liability
is not the number of illegal users that indirect liability thwarts. It is the number of users who
switch from copying illegally to purchasing through legal channels. In fact, individuals who
stop using the copyrighted work illegally and then do not purchase legally represent social
loss, in that their utility is obviously diminished but there is no offsetting gain elsewhere in
society. Things become even more complicated when one considers the possibility that
illegal use can lead to legal use - for instance when illegal music trading online ironically
turns out to help a new artist gain a following. For a discussion of other wrinkles, see Yan-
nis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson & Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 117 (1999).
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tainty. A producer responsible for a new audio recording device, for
example, might find it difficult to predict what courts will require in
the new setting. In response, such a producer might choose to be ex-
cessively cautious. This explains the safe harbor provision that was
introduced by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Thanks to that
provision, Internet service providers and other firms associated with
the Internet know that they are immune from indirect liability as long
as they follow the guidelines explicitly set forth. This safe harbor thus
eliminates the risk created by an otherwise uncertain legal standard.
Unfortunately, these firms are likely still too cautious; as Neal Katyal
notes, "[b]ecause an ISP derives little utility from providing access to
a risky subscriber, a legal regime that places [any risk of] liability on
an ISP for the acts of its subscribers will quickly lead the ISP to purge
risky ones from its system." 35 That said, competition in the market for
Internet service provision should mitigate this problem.
36
In addition to negligence liability and safe harbors, an efficient
indirect liability regime might also include a tailored tax applicable to
particular tools, services, or venues associated with copyright in-
fringement. We say "might" because a tax proposal is likely to be
more influenced by interest group politics than by efficiency consid-
erations, and we worry about opening Pandora's box. Putting interest
group concerns to one side, however, a tax would be appropriate in
instances where a price increase would reduce the harm caused by
illegal behavior more than it would interfere with the social benefits
that derive from legal interactions. Thus, for example, it might be at-
tractive to impose a small per-use tax on photocopying machines, at
least if the resulting revenues would non-trivially increase the incen-
tive to create and disseminate copyrighted work and the tax itself
would not significantly discourage legitimate photocopier use. The
closest the current system comes to establishing a tax of this sort is the
35. Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007-08
(2001).
36. For a more skeptical view - albeit applied to a strict liability rule as opposed to a
negligence standard - see Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cvberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 901 (2002).
There are of course other concerns to keep in mind when considering the desirability of a
negligence standard. For instance, negligence rules work well only to the extent that courts
can accurately assess damages, because the fear of having to pay damages where adequate
precautions are not taken is what inspires adequate precautions in the first place. Unfortu-
nately, in copyright, estimating damages is notoriously difficult. Has online music trading
really taken the steam out of music sales, or has online trading sparked renewed interest in
popular music? And even if online trading did decrease music sales, how does one price the
harm of a single traded song, given that music is typically sold in multiple-song packages
and that many people trade music that they would not otherwise buy? And all that ignores
the real harm at stake here, namely, the shift in consumer attitudes with respect to the pro-
priety of copying, rather than purchasing, music. The better these damage estimates, the
more efficient the liability rule. But that is true for any liability scheme, from the negligence
rule discussed in this Article to even a strict liability alternative.
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royalty regime created by the Audio Home Recording Act. 37 That ap-
proach is different, however, in that the royalty regime displaces neg-
ligence liability instead of supplementing it.38
V. INDIRECT LIABILITY IN CONTEXT
When evaluating different indirect liability rules from a broad
public policy perspective, it is important to remember that indirect
liability is just one of several mechanisms by which society tailors the
incentive to create and disseminate original work. Other mechanisms
abound, including, most obviously, adjustments to the scope and dura-
tion of copyright protection, and, less obviously, such alternatives as
criminal penalties - now applicable to certain types of infringe-
ment39 - and even the cash incentives put forward by the National
Endowment for the Arts. This is an important point because indirect
liability must be evaluated in light of these alternatives. In the end,
whatever incentive authors need, society should deliver it using the
combination of mechanisms that imposes the least social cost.
One implication here is that sometimes indirect liability should
not be an option. The costs in terms of unavoidable interference with
legitimate products might be too high, and society would therefore be
better off forcing copyright holders to rely on other mechanisms.
37. There are private organizations that come even closer, implementing this sort of tax
system through licenses and the threat of litigation rather than through explicit statutory
provisions. The most notable of these is the Copyright Clearance Center, an international
organization that "manages rights relating to over 1.75 million works" and in the United
States alone licenses over 10,000 firms including 92 of the Fortune 100 companies. Copy-
right Clearance Ctr., Inc., Corporate Overview, at http://www.copyright.com
About/default.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
38. It is possible that, in certain instances, displacing negligence liability is the efficient
approach. For instance, Neil Netanel argues in a current working paper that Congress should
declare certain types of unlicensed online file swapping legal and then, in exchange, require
firms that profit from file swapping activity to build a modest copyright levy into the price
of their various goods and services. NEIL WEiNSTOCK NETANEL, IMPOSE A
NONCOMMERCIAL USE LEVY TO ALLOW FREE P2P FILE-SWAPPING AND REMIXING (Univ.
of Texas Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 044. Nov. 2002).
The downsides to this proposal are the familiar objections that higher prices will discourage
some legitimate purchasers; that private parties can negotiate this sort of license on their
own if it is efficient: that this approach dampens any incentive firms face to redesign file
swapping such that it better respects the traditional rights recognized in copyright holders;
and that interest group politics can too easily influence this sort of particularized legislation.
The upsides, however, are significant. Having paid the copyright tax, consumers would be
free to upload and exchange music at the efficient marginal cost of zero. Also, this compul-
sory license approach might better balance copyright holders' legitimate interest in earning
a reward with society's competing interest in seeing unfettered competition in the design of
new technologies and new business models.
39. Under the No Electronic Theft Act, for example, "any person who infringes a copy-
ight willfully.., for purposes of... financial gain," and any person who infringes a copy-
right willfully where the retail value of the infringing copies exceeds $1,000 during any
180-day period, risks up to ten years imprisonment. See Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678
(1997) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319-20 and 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2003)).
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Conversely - and this is a point typically overlooked in the copyright
literature - sometimes other mechanisms are too costly and indirect
liability should therefore be the only option. For example, in the
1980s many firms sold software tools that helped computer users pi-
rate copyrighted videogames. Copyright holders were able to sue the
firms on indirect theories and the computer users on direct ones. But
because detection and litigation were so expensive, direct liability in
this instance led to almost random penalties; of the millions of equally
culpable computer users, only a handful were dragged into court. To
many, the injustice of a legal right enforced so randomly outweighed
whatever benefit those lawsuits offered. It therefore might have been
better policy to take away the option of direct liability and allow
copyright holders to sue only the firms.
To take another example, it might be the case that copyright hold-
ers injured by online music swapping should not be given the choice
of either suing the individuals who swap music or suing the services
that facilitate the practice, but instead should be allowed only to sue
the services. After all, a lawsuit brought by one copyright holder
against a service like Napster generates positive externalities that
benefit all copyright holders. A lawsuit against a particular Napster
user, by contrast, is unlikely to have so broad a beneficial effect. If
that is true, it might well improve efficiency to require that copyright
holders go after services, not individuals, even if the opposite strategy
would be in the private interest of a given copyright holder.
We have focused thus far on comparisons among various legal
and governmental tools, but of course indirect liability (like copyright
law more generally) should also be evaluated in light of the many
technological remedies available to copyright holders. Online music
piracy, for example, can be discouraged through the use of encrypted
music files that are difficult to copy without permission. Encryption is
imperfect, and it also has its costs; for instance, encrypted music can-
not be easily accessed by someone interested in making a lawful par-
ody. As before, the point is that these costs and benefits can only be
evaluated by comparing them to the costs and benefits associated with
direct liability, indirect liability, and any other workable alternative.
Lastly, like any legal issue, these questions about the relative vir-
tues of indirect liability have to be evaluated dynamically. When the
Ninth Circuit indicated that Napster would be liable for its role in
online music piracy, new services arose to take Napster's place. Some
of those services attempted to avoid liability by basing their opera-
tions outside the United States. 40 Others designed their technologies
such that there was no clear central party to hold accountable in
40. See, e.g., Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 103.
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court.41 These sorts of responses were both predictable and inevitable.
They do not argue against indirect liability, but they cannot be ignored
when deciding how much the copyright regime should rely on indirect
liability as a substitute for other types of marginal incentives.
VI. CONCLUSION
When individuals infringe copyright, they often use tools, ser-
vices, and venues provided by other parties. In this Article, we have
considered the extent to which those other parties should be held li-
able for the resulting infringement. As we have emphasized, the main
argument in favor of liability is that, although these parties are only
indirectly responsible, they are typically in a good position to either
prevent copyright infringement or pay for the harm it causes. The
owner of a flea market, for instance, can discourage copyright in-
fringement by screening would-be vendors and performing spot
checks on transactions. Similarly, although firms that produce photo-
copiers might not be able to discourage piracy directly, they can easily
build into their prices a small fee that could in turn be used to com-
pensate injured copyright holders.
Indirect liability has a significant drawback, however, in that legal
liability - even if carefully tailored - inevitably interferes with the
legitimate use of implicated tools, services, and venues. So, while
aggressive monitoring at flea markets would indeed aid in copyright
enforcement, it would also raise the costs of running a flea market and
in that way disrupt the market for secondhand goods and antiques.
Similarly, increasing the price of photocopiers might create a pool of
money from which to compensate authors, but the resulting higher
prices would also impose an unavoidable harm: legitimate users
would be less likely to purchase photocopiers. This concern is particu-
larly pronounced for new technologies, where the implications of
copyright liability are often difficult to predict. One can only wonder,
for example, how different the Internet would look today had it been
clear from that outset that, say, Internet service providers were going
to be held accountable for online copyright violations.
Modem copyright law balances these tensions through a variety
of common law doctrines and statutory provisions. In this Article, we
have introduced those rules and evaluated them from an economic
perspective. We have also endeavored to make clear how these issues
41. Although it is unclear how helpful that strategy will prove. See, e.g., Douglas Licht-
man & David Jacobson, Anonymity a Double-Edged Sword for Pirates On-line, CHi. TRIB.,
Apr. 13, 2000, at 25 (suggesting that anonymous peer-to-peer file swapping can be defeated
through the use of decoy files polluting the network); Lior J. Strahilovitz, Charismatic
Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (emphasizing the fragility of the incentive to upload, as
opposed to download, copyrighted music).
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relate to the broader question of how the copyright system should en-
courage authors to create and distribute original work. The core in-
sight is that every mechanism for rewarding authors inevitably
introduces some form of inefficiency, and thus the only way to deter-
mine the proper scope for indirect liability is to weigh its costs and
benefits against the costs and benefits associated with other plausible
mechanisms for rewarding authors.
